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Directive 2013/48/EU of 22 October 2013 ‘on the right of access to a lawyer in
criminal proceedings’ had an unfortunate fate in Bulgaria. Not only has the country
been persistently violating its provisions since its entry into force, but it also made
efforts to transpose it only in 2018, two years after the deadline. The transposition,
however, is troublesome because the government used the Directive as a pretext
to revive a totalitarian practice --– secret arrests. Bulgaria’s Prosecutor’s Office can
now detain adults in secret for 48 hours and children for 24 hours. Bulgaria has
been systemically breaching the Directive for 6 years without any consequences:
the European Commission’s bureaucracy has become a fig leaf for human rights
abuses.
Goals of Directive 2013/48/EU
While the Directive 2013/48/EU has a broad scope, in this paper I focus on two
procedural rights which it is supposed to enhance. Its Article 3 enumerates the
circumstances in which a lawyer should be present in criminal proceedings. Article 5
enshrines the right to inform a third party of one’s arrest without undue delay. Article
12 requires Member States to provide effective remedies for breaches of rights
granted by the Directive. These procedural rights are intimately linked to the right
to a fair trial and the right to defense – Articles 47 and 48(2) of the EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights.
Deliberate Breaches
Bulgaria’s deliberate breaches of the right to a lawyer and the right to inform a third
party of one’s arrest are visible in reports by international organizations and media
coverage.
According to the latest report on Bulgaria by the United Nations Committee against
Torture from December 2017, ‘more than 70 percent of detained persons do not
have access to a lawyer from the very outset of criminal  proceedings…some do not
have legal representation throughout the criminal proceedings against them’. The
Committee is concerned that meetings with a lawyer take place in the presence of
a police officer and that public defenders on call selected from the national legal aid
registry are not independent from the police.
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The latest report by the Committee for the Prevention of Torture of the Council of
Europe of May 2018 on Bulgaria, notes ‘the absence of any real progress’ in the
application of the right to notify one’s detention to a third party, the right of access to
a lawyer, and the right to be informed of one’s rights.
In Bulgaria, people could be detained without legal grounds, especially if they are
government opponents. In 2018, investigative journalists Dimitar Stoyanov and Attila
Biro learned that documents evidencing misuse of EU funds were being burned in
the countryside. After informing the competent authorities, they went on site to cover
the story. However, they were arrested by the police although they showed their
press cards. They were kept in custody, without being able to contact a lawyer or
inform close ones of their detention. The incident drew the attention of the Council of
Europe and the Bulgarian court subsequently established that the arrest was illegal.
Bulgaria’s Prosecutor’s Office relies on detention to influence trials. Under Article
64(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Prosecutor’s Office can order 72-
hour arrests which are not subject to judicial oversight --– a violation of the ECHR
as established in Zvezdev v Bulgaria. The Prosecutor’s Office often uses this
prerogative to attempt to force people to make statements which can be used
against them or to make false testimonies. In the well-known Ivancheva and Petrova
case, Petrova was told that she would become ‘a corpse’ if she did not testify
against Ivancheva. It should be noted that there is no legislation which forbids the
admissibility of evidence procured through torture/ill-treatment.
Finally, authorities may appoint public defenders to comply with the requirement for
access to a lawyer only on the surface. It is not uncommon for public defenders to
violate attorney-client privilege and/or synchronize the defense of accused people
with the prosecution, which, essentially, deprives the notion of defense in criminal
proceedings of its purpose. In the Ivancheva and Petrova case, the backup public
defender of Petrova who was appointed by the Prosecutor’s Office complained
to the same Prosecutor’s Office that she was not invited to observe investigation
activities unlike the defenders authorized by Petrova herself. The backup defender
said she ‘represent[ed] the Prosecutor’s Office’ in the proceedings and in light of the
long process of proof of guilt, which was on the horizon, ‘weaknesses could not be
tolerated’, thus implying she worked to protect the prosecution’s interests.
Another Frankenstein
Bulgaria took measures to transpose Directive 2013/48/EU only after the European
Commission published a reasoned opinion pursuant to Article 258 TFEU in January
2018. Under the guise of transposing the Directive, the country increased the already
excessive repressive arsenal of Bulgaria’s Prosecutor’s Office.
Bulgaria transposed Article 3 on the right to a lawyer only partially even though there
are no provisions in national legislation which ensure the same effect as the entire
article. For instance, Bulgarian law does not explicitly enshrine the right to a lawyer
for suspects. Moreover, Bulgaria transformed Article 5(3)(a) and 5(3)(b) which allow
temporary derogations from the right to inform a third party of detention into a rule on
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secret arrests which can be applied arbitrarily, considering Bulgaria’s longstanding
problems.
Legislators patched this exception to the infamous Article 64(2) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure discussed above: the person could be detained for three days
before taken to court to determine if a mandatory measure is necessary and for the
first 48 hours their close ones will not know of the detention.
The initial proposal for the new Article 63(9) of Bulgaria’s Code of Criminal
Procedure stipulated:
Where there is an urgent need to avert serious adverse consequences for
the life, liberty or physical integrity of a person, or to prevent a situation
in which criminal proceedings could be jeopardized,  jeopardy to criminal
proceedings, [informing a third party of the deprivation of liberty] could be
delayed by 48 hours.
The initial proposal for the new Article 386(5), which concerns the arrests of children,
resonated the same idea, but delayed informing third parties by 24 hours. Regarding
both adults and children, the decision is taken by Bulgaria’s Prosecutor’s Office
pursuant to the new Article 63(10) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
The initial proposal for law amendments completely ignored the strict requirements
on derogations imposed by Article 8 of the Directive. After public uproar, the
following sentence was added to the final versions of Article 63(9) and Article 386(5):
Suspension of [notification of a third party] shall be applied in the particular
circumstances of each case and shall not go beyond what is necessary and
is not based solely on the nature or gravity of the crime committed.
A Question of Context
Those familiar with the Bulgarian context immediately see how the above provisions
are problematic despite the last-minute addition, which a priori does not cover all
restrictions on derogations stipulated in Article 8 of Directive 2013/48/EU.
Bulgaria’s Prosecutor’s Office has a vertical structure, also known as a Soviet model,
which does not have proper checks and balances. All decisions depend on the
General Prosecutor who acts with impunity. The dysfunctionality of this institution
may explain why Bulgaria has already been found to be in 291 violations of Article
6 (right to a fair trial) and 270 violations of Article 5 (right to liberty) by the ECtHR.
Bulgaria stubbornly refuses to ensure checks and balances in the prosecution even
though it is required to do so under Kolevi v Bulgaria, which was rendered in 2009,
and it is reminded of these obligations twice per year by the Council of Europe. In
light of bogus criminal proceedings which the prosecution has initiated in the past
and its record of human rights abuses, these new powers can easily be misused.
This secrecy entails opportunities for psychological pressure (at best) and prevents
third parties from helping to find an appropriate lawyer.
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Finally, it is important to note that Bulgaria has failed to transpose Article 12 of
Directive 2013/48/EU, which requires Member States to provide effective remedies
for breaches of rights granted by the Directive. Under Bulgarian law, which was
amended in 2017 as part of a major crackdown on human rights (Article 248(3) of
the Code of Criminal Procedure), one can currently contest procedural violations
before the court only when there is an indictment in court and only at the first pre-
hearing following indictment. Moreover, Bulgarian law allows the prosecution
to constitute someone as an accused party but postpone indictment indefinitely
(Chapter 26 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). Hence, accused people have no
effective remedies for breaches of rights granted by Directive 2013/48/EU or the
fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 47 and 48 of the EU Charter.
The EU’s Inertia
Bulgaria has breached Directive 2013/48/EU in at least three ways – late
transposition, violating its provisions, and incorrect/partial transposition. The
Commission’s laid-back approach regarding these developments, which surely
provide further evidence of the assault on the rule of law and human rights in the
country, is worrisome.
The Commission published a reasoned opinion with which it invited Bulgaria to
inform it about how it has transposed the Directive only in January 2018, 14 months
after the deadline for transposition.
After Bulgaria’s government put forward the Bill on secret arrests, which allegedly
purported to transpose the Directive, there was a wave of criticism by civil society.
Bulgaria’s President attempted to veto the Bill to no avail. While one may understand
why the Commission did not address the debate in Bulgaria in a public statement,
its reaction to a formal infringement claim I submitted after the Bill passed the first
reading in Parliament in 2018 truly puzzled me. In the complaint, I provided evidence
of the breaches of the Directive since its entry into force as well as the incorrect
transposition. The Commission informed me it intended to close the file because the
arguments I had raised fell within the scope of compliance assessment it planned to
carry out within the next 12 months. Almost a year later, the Commission does not
seem to have taken further action to force Bulgaria to comply with its obligations.
The Commission’s relentless patience shows through in other cases of violations of
Directives concerning fundamental rights. Bulgaria still has not transposed Directive
2016/343 on the presumption of innocence although it was required to do so by
April 2018. In an infringement claim I submitted in May 2018, I highlighted how
Bulgaria had deliberately violated the provisions of this Directive since its entry into
force. I still have not received a response to my complaint. The Commission has not
published a reasoned opinion on this matter either.
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When the EU’s Patience is Not a Virtue
Bulgaria’s disrespect for EU Directives concerning fundamental rights adds one
more shade to the grim picture of the state of its rule of law. Instead of reforming
its Prosecutor’s Office, Bulgaria increased its already excessive powers through
perverse creativity – limiting fundamental rights by pretending to comply with CVM
recommendations, complying with ECtHR case law only on the surface, etc. Using
an EU Directive supposed to enhance fundamental rights to revive a totalitarian
practice takes the assault on human rights to a new orbit of legislative hooliganism.
The Commission’s inertia has contributed to many of these problems. In prior
articles, I have raised concern about the Commission’s lenience vis-à-vis CVM
recommendations. In this article, I hope to have illustrated why it is problematic
when the Commission relies on its usual assessment delays when it comes to
Directives concerning fundamental rights. One can reasonably predict that suspects
and accused people will continue to be deprived of their right to a lawyer while the
Prosecutor’s Office has added one more tool for harassment to its arsenal, which
can be misused against inconvenient government opponents and their children –
secret arrests.
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